Saudi Arabia’s Approach to the Gaza Conflict

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which escalated once again on 7 October 2023, has been a turning point for Saudi Arabia. Like Europe and the United States (US), as well as other countries of the Arab world, Riyadh had in recent years almost entirely disregarded the political significance of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The Saudi administration had adopted a policy of normalising relations with Israel, as had the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which, under Donald Trump’s leadership, signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 and thereby established diplomatic relations. Following the Accords, talks were launched with Israel in the diplomatic, commercial and security fields, and steps towards the official recognition of Israel were expected to be taken in the course of the process. Indeed, in an interview with the US television channel Fox News in September 2023, Mohammed bin Salman stated that the two sides were getting closer to an agreement every day. One month later, however, with the outbreak of the Gaza War in October 2023, the normalisation in relations gave way to a new crisis.

At the start of the conflict, Saudi Arabia directly condemned the “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” carried out by Hamas on 7 October. In the first days of the conflict, at a time when relations with Israel were moving towards normalisation, Riyadh had accused Hamas of escalating the tension in Gaza. After Israel’s attacks on civilian residential areas, however, Saudi Arabia began to change its rhetoric. Taking particular account of the reaction of Saudi and Arab public opinion, the Riyadh administration stated once again that it directly condemned Israeli aggression and supported a two-state solution in Palestine. With a view to securing a ceasefire, Saudi Arabia held a series of meetings in Riyadh with representatives of the European Union, Arab and other countries. The Saudi administration supported the ceasefire negotiations conducted through the mediation of Qatar and Egypt in order to prevent the Gaza War from destabilising the entire region. In the same period, pointing to negotiation processes aimed at resolving the Palestinian question by diplomatic means, Riyadh announced that its policies of normalisation with Israel were directly linked to the resolution of the Palestinian question.

In this framework, the study entitled “Saudi Arabia and the Gaza War” prepared by Sebastian Sons argues that Saudi Arabia has been unable to pursue an active foreign policy for three main reasons. According to Sons, Saudi Arabia has been unable to pursue an active policy in the Gaza War because of threats to its economic, security and identity-building policies. On the other hand, in addition to these three reasons, Iran’s growing influence in the region in particular, the possibility of a new Arab Spring and Israel’s extremely radical and revisionist border policy also threaten Saudi interests.In this context, it is worth examining Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Gaza War under 6 headings:

1- Economic Reasons:

Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia launched a programme of both social and economic transformation. Within the framework of the “Vision 2030” programme, which the Crown Prince put into effect in 2017, investments were planned in the tourism, sport, research, culture and entertainment sectors. Saudi Arabia emphasised the importance of regional stability in order to secure its mega-projects, which require foreign investment and external capital. The success of ambitious mega-projects such as “The Line”, a high-technology city under construction in the north-west of the country, is directly linked to stability in the Red Sea. It has been announced that The Line will be a technology city housing 9 million people and built on an area of only 34 square kilometres.

In the field of tourism, while Saudi Arabia plans to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup, it is also making efforts to organise many world championships in various sports, including the Asian Winter Games. Riyadh expects 150 million tourists to visit the country by 2030. The success of the economic diversification and mega-projects launched by Saudi Arabia, however, depends on securing regional stability. The ongoing war in Gaza and the possibility of its expansion therefore jeopardise Riyadh’s plans to diversify the economy.

2- Security Interests:

Saudi Arabia aims to expand its economic interests and ensure its security through multilateral diplomacy. Within the framework of policies of multilateral diplomacy and de-escalation, it took steps to normalise its relations with Iran and Israel as well as the West. While steps towards normalisation with Israel were being taken after the Abraham Accords, direct talks had also begun with the Iranian regime. The invitation of Bashar al-Assad to Riyadh can be seen as a result of Saudi Arabia’s policies of regional stability. The Gaza War, however, threatens Riyadh’s efforts at multilateral diplomacy and de-escalation and its initiatives aimed at preventing regional instability.

3- Identity Building:

Through the projects he launched in the societal and social spheres, Mohammed bin Salman aimed to bring about transformations in traditional Saudi identity. The work carried out under the slogan “Saudi Arabia First” aimed to limit the influence of Wahhabi and Salafi clerics and to revive “Saudi nationalism”. Indeed, after the signing of the Abraham Accords, hashtags such as “Palestine is not my cause” were launched on social media and supported by the government. Riyadh presented to its own society the paradigm that every country should prioritise its own interests in foreign policy, independently of the Palestinian question. Steps had also been taken in the civic sphere, particularly to strengthen women’s participation in public life. The Gaza War, however, led to a revival of pro-Palestinian, religious and pan-Arab notions of identity among young people. Israel’s aggression in Gaza strengthened demands at societal level for relations with Israel to be ended and for Riyadh to champion the traditional Palestinian cause. The Saudis’ policies of building a new identity suffered a major blow with the Gaza War. For this reason, Riyadh criticises both Hamas and the Israeli administration.

4- Iranian Influence:

Saudi Arabia is seriously disturbed by Iran’s growing influence in the region through paramilitary militia forces. Besides Iran’s direct military and political influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, its influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah is regarded by Riyadh as a significant threat. According to Saudi Arabia, Iran threatens the security of the countries of the region by destabilising Palestine and the Middle East through the militia forces in the region. It is also believed that Iran is trying to draw Israel back into the Lebanese arena through Hezbollah. With Hezbollah’s declaration of war on Israel on 8 October, the Saudi administration has drawn attention to the possibility that Israel could occupy Lebanon again and that this could open the door to a regional conflict. It is wary of Iran dragging the Arabs into a major war through Hezbollah.

In other words, according to Saudi analysts, Iran is dragging the Arab peoples into the conflict by pursuing a policy aimed at obstructing regional reconciliation efforts on the question of Gaza and Palestine. Riyadh, which prioritises a policy of rapprochement with Tehran, aims to ensure that Iran reins in its allies and to prevent the Gaza conflict from escalating to a larger scale. The Riyadh administration believes that Iran is undermining Arab–Israeli talks through Hamas. Going further still, Riyadh accuses Iran of posing a threat to regional peace through Hamas, the Houthis and Hezbollah. It therefore advocates a peaceful solution in the Gaza War and states that military solutions do nothing for the Arab peoples beyond expanding Iran’s influence. Because of Iranian influence, the Saudi administration is pursuing a more passive policy in the Gaza War.

5- Wariness of a New Arab Spring:

Saudi Arabia is concerned that the Gaza War may give rise to a new movement of social opposition in the region. The Saudi administration has imposed restrictions on public demonstrations in support of Gaza, banned the wearing of clothing referring to Gaza and the Palestinian cause, and arrested social media users who sympathise with Gaza. At the same time, arrests and prison sentences are being imposed on those who take part in protests. Although many human rights organisations have criticised, on grounds of freedom of expression, the arrests carried out by Saudi Arabia against those taking part in protests, the bans are still in force. The main reason for these measures is stated to be the concern to prevent a new Arab Spring process from emerging. It is clear that a possible popular uprising would threaten the security of regimes, particularly in Egypt and the Gulf countries. For this reason, the Riyadh regime accuses both Hamas and Iran, and Israel, of radicalising the region.

6- Israel’s Violent Policies:

While taking steps towards normalisation with Israel within the framework of the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia saw Israel as a balancing country, particularly against threats emanating from Iran. At the same time, it aimed to obtain new weapons from the US with Israel’s support and to secure support for peaceful nuclear programmes. It was thought that during the normalisation process Israel could also be persuaded on a two-state solution in Palestine. The Gaza War and the policies of removing Palestinians from the region, however, have changed Riyadh’s view of Israel. In the month the war began, the Riyadh administration announced that the negotiations with Israel had been suspended. Riyadh announced that it would not recognise the Tel Aviv administration until the Palestinian question was resolved. Indeed, the Saudi researcher Hesham Alghannam argues that with the Gaza War Israel has abandoned its position of playing a balancing role against Iran’s influence in the region and has begun to turn into an actor that threatens regional stability. Saudi Arabia’s strategy of preventing the escalation of conflicts in the region and of avoiding conflict has lost its meaning in the face of Israel’s aggression. In an interview with the BBC on 9 January, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Prince Khalid bin Bandar, stated that “because of the far-right policies of the current government in Israel, Riyadh would not prioritise a policy of normalisation with Israel without a two-state solution”. He also stated that the conflict would not end if the policies pursued by the far right continued. Prince Khalid further stated that, with the war that has caused the deaths of thousands of civilians and widespread destruction in Gaza, the region has come under the risk of renewed radicalisation.

The Gaza War is regarded as a blow to both Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policy priorities

In conclusion, while calling on international and regional powers to stop Israeli aggression, the Saudi Arabian administration at the same time accuses the Israeli government and its extreme radical right-wing coalition partners, as well as Iran, through militia forces under Iranian influence such as Hamas and Hezbollah, of dragging the Arabs into great chaos and conflict. The Gaza War is regarded as a blow to both Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policy priorities. It can therefore be argued that the Riyadh regime has not pursued an active foreign policy in the Gaza War. The King of Saudi Arabia, who has officially used the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques since 1986, faces a great dilemma.

Prof. Veysel Ayhan

*This article was first published here.